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CALIFORNIA ETHICS IN REVIEW 1996
Each year, the Standing Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility of the State Bar of California re-
leases formal opinions regarding current ethical issues.
These opinions are advisory only and are not binding on the
courts, the State Bar of California, its Board of Governors, its
members or any person or tribunal charged with regulatory
responsibility. Below is a summary of the formal opinions re-
leased during 1996.
1. Formal Opinion 1996-145
Under Rule 2-100 of the California Rules of Professional
Conduct (CRPC), if an attorney knows or should know that
an opposing party is represented by counsel, she cannot com-
municate with that party about the subject of the representa-
tion without the permission of the party's attorney. The rea-
son for this rule is to prevent an uncounseled party from
making statements to the opposing party's lawyer that could
later be used against her in court.' Formal Opinion 1996-145
deals with three issues related to CRPC 2-100.
The opinion first addresses whether an attorney is re-
quired to ask an opposing party if she is represented by coun-
sel. Because the purpose of CRPC 2-100 is to preserve "the
attorney-client relationship and the proper functioning of the
administration of justice,"2 it is logical to think that one is
expected to ask. However, according to the opinion, "because
the courts have held that an attorney has knowledge based
on an objective standard and there is no express requirement
in CRPC 2-100," the lawyer does not have to ask. The reason-
ing is apparently this: whether an attorney knows about a
party's representation is determined by an objective stan-
dard; therefore, even if the attorney asks, and the party
falsely claims not to be represented, the lawyer violates
CRPC 2-100 if she should have known the party was
represented.
1. Continental Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 854-55 (Ct.
App. 1995).
2. Mitton v. State Bar, 455 P.2d 753, 758 (Cal. 1969).
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CRPC 2-100 does not contain an express inquiry require-
ment, and the opinion does not find an implied one. The
Opinion cautions the reader, however, that local bar rules
might require a lawyer to ask if a party is represented before
communicating with her about the subject of representation.
Such a requirement protects a represented party, even when
the opposing lawyer has no reason to know about the repre-
sentation. As long as the party answers truthfully when
asked, CRPC 2-100 protects her by prohibiting the communi-
cation. Regardless of the local rules, however, it is prudent
for a lawyer to tell every client not to talk to opposing counsel
unless she is present.
The second issue is whether an attorney's obligation
under CRPC 2-100 is affected by the means of communication
(written, telephonic, or in person), or by who initiates the con-
tact. The obligation is not affected by the circumstances and
means of communication; however, these factors can be
taken into account in determining whether the attorney
knew or should have known that the opposing party was rep-
resented. An example3 would be a registered letter from a
party. The means of communication, that is, the fact that the
party wrote rather than telephoned or visited, does not affect
the duty of the lawyer. However, depending on the circum-
stances, the fact that the party took care to send it by regis-
tered mail might put the lawyer on notice that the party is
represented. Another example: suppose a party telephones
opposing counsel. The call might be the first contact between
the two or it might be in reply to a phone message from the
lawyer. The lawyer's obligation is the same regardless of who
initiated the contact. However, who initiated the contact may
be taken into account when determining if the lawyer should
have known the party was represented. If, for example, the
lawyer receives a return call one week after leaving a
message, she might have reason to suspect that the party re-
tained a lawyer in the interim.
The third issue discussed is whether an attorney can rely
upon a party's statement that she is not represented by coun-
sel. As alluded to above, the answer is no. Under CRPC 2-
100, an attorney's duty is to not communicate with a repre-
sented party without the consent of counsel if she knows or
3. The opinion did not offer any examples.
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should know that the party is represented. This duty is not
changed by a party's statement, although the statement can
help determine whether the attorney knew or should have
known about the representation. An example might be a sit-
uation where Lawyer A reasonably suspects a party is repre-
sented because she saw the party leaving a law office. Sup-
pose that when asked, the party falsely claims that it was her
office, and that she is a lawyer and is representing herself. In
this case, it might be reasonable for Lawyer A to believe that
she may ethically talk to the party about the subject of
representation.
2. Formal Opinion 1996-146
Client fraud creates a difficult situation because it re-
quires a lawyer to carefully balance several ethical obliga-
tions. Formal Opinion 1996-146 concerns an attorney's obli-
gations in two situations: when she knows her client has
used her services to commit a fraud, and when she knows her
client is committing a fraud or will commit a fraud.
Let us suppose a client is constructing a residential de-
velopment in three phases, each phase to be completed before
the next is begun. She has a lawyer draft a standard sales
contract to be used in all the phases, and a provision in the
contract warrants the quality of the materials to be used.
To illustrate the situation where the client has used the
lawyer's services to commit a fraud, assume that Phase I has
been built, and all the homes have been sold using the sales
contract drafted by the lawyer. In the presence of others, the
developer casually mentions to the lawyer that she deliber-
ately used substandard materials to cut costs. Under Califor-
nia Business and Professions Code (CBPC) 6068(e), the law-
yer cannot reveal this fraud to anyone without the consent of
the client. This duty of confidentiality is extremely broad and
should not be confused with the attorney-client privilege.
CBPC 6068(e) covers any information that the client would
not want revealed. It does not matter that the information
was not obtained through the attorney-client relationship,
and it does not matter that others share the knowledge. The
lawyer may not reveal the fraud.
Let us further suppose that the client wants the lawyer
to draft a letter to the Phase I homeowners that includes the
following statement: "In your sales contract, the developer
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warranted the quality of all building materials. The war-
ranty speaks for itself." The lawyer may not do so. The law-
yer must maintain client confidences, but under CBPC
6068(d) she can only do so by means that are consistent with
truth. Although the statement in the letter might not be un-
truthful in and of itself, in context it will tend to deceive by
giving the impression that quality materials were used.
Therefore, the lawyer cannot write the letter.
To illustrate a case of ongoing fraud, suppose that Phase
II is now under construction, and the lawyer herself observes
that inferior materials are again being used. If an attorney
learns that a client is committing fraud, she should advise
the client of that fact and about the possibility of future liabil-
ity. This is part of her general duty under CRPC 3-500 and
CBPC 6068(m) to keep her client informed. The lawyer may
advise the client to discontinue the fraud. If the client contin-
ues, the attorney must at least limit her representation to ar-
eas where she will not be participating in it or furthering it.
For example, the lawyer would need to refrain from negotiat-
ing sales of the substandard Phase II homes. If it is not possi-
ble to limit her representation so that she is not furthering
the fraud, then she must withdraw from the representation
entirely. Under CRPC Rule 3-700(B)(2) withdrawal from rep-
resentation is mandatory if the lawyer knows or should know
that continuing the representation will result in a violation of
her ethical duties. In withdrawing from the representation,
she must not disclose the fraud and she must act in a manner
that reasonably avoids prejudicing the rights of the client.
3. Formal Opinion 1996-147
This opinion discusses when an attorney may ethically
bill two or more clients for work done at the same time. Such
a situation can arise, for example, when an attorney is travel-
ing on behalf of one client and uses some of the travel time to
work on another client's matter, or when an attorney repre-
sents several clients and spends time doing work which per-
tains to all their cases.
In any discussion of fees, it is important to remember
that the lawyer has the highest fiduciary duty to her client.
She must therefore make sure any contract between them is
fair and reasonable. This overlaps her duty under CRPC 2-
400(A). Under 2-400(A), she must "not enter into an agree-
[Vol. 37868
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ment for, charge, or collect an illegal or unconscionable fee."
As a fiduciary, the lawyer also must disclose fully all details
of the fee agreement. This is in accord with CBPC 6148,
which requires that a written fee agreement contain "any ba-
sis for compensation including.., hourly rates, statutory fees
or flat fees, and other standard rates, fee and charges .....
Therefore, if a lawyer wants to be able to double charge for
her time, she must make her intention clear in the fee agree-
ment, and she must not charge an unfair fee under any cir-
cumstances. The opinion illustrates these principles in three
hypotheticals.
The first is a situation where an attorney has a written
fee agreement with Client A in which she is to be paid for
time spent traveling to court appearances. While making a
six-hour trip for Client A, she spends five hours working on a
matter for Client B. The attorney can of course bill Client B
for the five hours, but may she also bill Client A for the six
hours? If Client A's matter had monopolized the lawyer's
time during the trip, then it would clearly be appropriate for
the lawyer to bill Client A for the entire six hours. Here,
however, the lawyer's time was not monopolized as she was
able to spend five hours working for Client B. Therefore she
may not charge Client A for the six hours unless her fee
agreements with both Client A and Client B clearly allow
double billing in this situation.
In the second hypothetical one lawyer is representing
four defendants in a lawsuit and attends a two-hour status
conference in which she represents all four of them. May she
charge each client for two hours, for a total of eight? The real
issue here is whether any of the clients is being charged an
unconscionable fee. If each of the four clients had a separate
lawyer, each would have had to pay for two hours of time.
Because the lawyer is only charging the clients what they
would have paid anyway, had they not all had the same law-
yer, she may charge each client for two hours. This, of course,
assumes that she has disclosed this billing practice to each
client in advance and that each client has consented.
In the final hypothetical, a lawyer represents one client
in four different lawsuits. The court schedules conferences
for each of the cases, all to be held on the same day. The
lawyer spends a total of four hours attending the conferences.
Must the attorney bill only for four hours, or may she bill four
869
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hours to each of the four case files for a total of sixteen hours?
Here the lawyer worked a total of four hours on behalf of a
single client. To charge for sixteen hours would be to charge
the client for work not actually performed, and would there-
fore constitute an unconscionable fee. Therefore, the lawyer
must charge only for the time actually spent, in this case,
four hours.
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